Possible objections to the hermeneutics of doctrine?

In chapters 7 & 8, Thiselton considers possible objections to the thesis he has been advocating in the Hermeneutics of Doctrine – that doctrine arises out of a dispositional account of belief; it is contingent, embodied in practices of life; communal, and formative. His predicted possible objections seem to be able to be classified under the following three categories.

Firstly, is it valid to use hermeneutical theories to apply it to Christian doctrine? Afterall, isn’t doctrine more concerned with coherence while hermeneutics and biblical exegesis more characterised by the respect for particularity? Doesn’t that bring the two into tension? Not apparently, Thiselton thinks so. The alleged tension is ‘more apparent than real’, he states (p.124). He quotes Pannenberg as one who held onto the importance of coherence in his view and understanding of systematic theology, but yet had a degree of contingency within that system. Thiselton states: “On the side of systematic theology, few have placed greater emphasis upon coherence than Wolfhart Pennenberg. […] Nevertheless this does not suggest, for Pannenberg, that the truth of Christian doctrine constitutes a “finished” system. First, all truth remains provisional upon the realisation of the eschaton. […] Second, if truth is derived from the living God who acts in ongoing history, the truth of doctrine and truth of God is disclosed “‘in a contingent manner.’” (p.125, his emphasis).

Second, does a communal, contingent, hermeneutical approach exclude epistemology i.e. if doctrine has a communal and contingent nature to it, then isn’t doctrine at the end of the day without any objective truth-claims, but merely the ‘product’ of ecclesial communities in particular situations? Thiselton answers with a resounding ‘No’. Quoting Pannenberg, he states that the truth of doctrine does not rest upon “a mere consensus theory of truth,” even if ecclesial consensus plays a role in the development of doctrine. It is not that the consensus of churches creates Christian doctrine, but that (quoting Pannenberg) “conviction of the divine truth of the Christian religion [establishes] and [justifies] the continual existence of Christian churches.” (p.126). Thiselton suggests that one of the main culprits leading to such a view is the general attack of “foundationalist epistemology”, which in turn is loosely and uncritically linked with modernity, ‘as if to suggest that all who have reservations about the one also reject the other, and thence turn toward the postmodern.’ (p.127). Thisleton goes on to differentiate between what he calls “hard” foundationalism and “soft” foundationalism, shunning the former but espousing the latter (p.128-130). He concludes this issue with the following (which arises from a context where he is critically evaluating the work of Richard Heyduck):

“On one side: a hermeneutic of doctrine affirms […] community, embodiment, narrative, drama, practices, wisdom, community identity, the place of the church as an interactive community […]. On the other side: none of this could be commended or accepted if it were to entail a retreat from epistemology; a consensus or social theory of truth; and an uncritical appropriation of the postmodern as such.” (p.131)

Elsewhere, he states: “A hermeneutic of doctrine prevents doctrine from becoming only a monologic discourse; a hermeneutic of doctrine prevents hermeneutics from becoming only relativistic.” (p.136, his emphasis).

Third, if much of hermeneutics consists is contingent-based, particular and formative, if hermeneutics consist of the two poles of “explanation” and “understanding” (where the former provides a critical or “checking” dimension while the latter provides a more creative and formative dimension), then in what way can we still speak of theology and doctrine as a “science”? Here (like in the previous 2 objections highlighted above), Thiselton draws on and discusses the work of many theologians or thinkers in hermeneutics, but what I found extremely useful is his discussion on T.F. Torrance, where he highlight’s Torrance’s five criteria for a “scientific” theology (p.148-49):

(1) The first is the utter lordship of the Object. The Knowledge of God entails an epistemological inversion. The human subject must not impose upon God as our Object of thought any prior categorisation or fixed horizon that will distort our understanding by speaking before we have listened. God speaks and humankind hears. Here is an inversion between subject and object (or better subject matter) – rather than subject study subject matter, here it is the subject matter transforming the subject!

(2) The second is an acknowledgement of the personal nature of the “Object “ of theology and doctrine. This is Jesus Christ as both “Person and Word”.

(3) The third is the notion of dialogue and conversation. The word of God creates “a community of conversation” that corresponds as far as possible with the “objectivity of the Object” and God’s glory. God gives himself as Lord, but in human form “within our space and time”. This coheres well with Thiselton’s earlier point of doctrine as communal, formative and embodied.

(4) The fourth is the centrality of Jesus Christ as the self-objectification of God for us in our humanity. This is the beginning point from which theological coherence grows. In another words, coherence in doctrine depends upon relating all theology ultimately to Christ.

(5) The fifth is the continual place and function of critique and self-critique (similar to the concept of “explanation”) in theology.

This leads Thiselton to conclude that ‘the nature of “theological science” place “scientific” theory firmly within a hermeneutical framework that not only allows but also positively nurtures formative, transformative, embodied, and dynamic doctrine’ (p.149, emphasis his). Further on, he writes, “Truth and understanding and their frame of reference remain dynamic, temporal, embodied, contingent, and provisional as well as coherent, and grounded in God.” (p.162)