The ontological significance of penal substitution - thinking deeper on PSA 4

Bruce McCormack has an interesting essay ‘The Ontological Presuppositions of Barth’s Doctrine of the Atonement’ in The Glory of the Atonement. He states that we must not separate the work of Christ from the person of Christ in our systematic theology considerations. A response to the challenges facing PSA today hence requires us to integrate PSA not only ‘into a well-ordered Christology, but into a well-ordered doctrine of the Trinity as well’ (p.348). And here is where he suggests Barth offers a great deal of help.

McCormack begins by exploring the importance of the Chalcedonian formula for understanding the person and work of Christ – the two natures (human and divine) coming together in the one person of our Lord Jesus Christ. The two natures ‘ “come together into a single person and a single subsistent being” and that, as such, “he is not parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the same only-begotten Son, God, Word, Lord Jesus Christ.”’ In another words, the unity of divine and human in Jesus is expressed in the singularity or one-ness of the person, in whom are found two distinct natures (p.349-50). In another words, it is not God in a human, but God as a human. The Chalcedonian formula is both helpful and crucial in understanding the unity of human and divine in Christ.

However, McCormack suggests that it still leaves some “unattended issues”. In the traditional Chalcedonian thinking, the Logos is thought of as the ruling principle of Christ’s human nature. This leaves open the suggestion that ‘the human nature is reduced to the status of a passive instrument in the hands of the Logos; it is the object upon which the Logos acts’ (p.352). It also leaves open the question ‘who is the Logos?’ Merely a human being? That’s an answer which we would label under “liberal” theology and one which is excluded by the Chalcedonian formula. The Logos simpliciter (the eternal logos)? Such an answer is not excluded by the Chalcedonian formula and is an answer that would promote the idea mentioned above of the Logos as the operative agent and the human nature as merely an object through which the Logos acts. Or should the Logos be thought of as the God-human in his divine-human unity? McCormack suggests that in our outworking of the Chalcedonian formula, we have more often than not headed towards the second option. And he suggests the reason why we head down this path is because of our concept of “divine immutability” – It was unthinkable for the ancients that God could suffer and die. Hence we
“[abstract] the Logos from his human nature in order, by turns, now to make of the human nature something to be acted upon by the Logos and now to make of that nature a subject in its own right in order to seal the Logos off hermeneutically from all that befalls that human nature from without. In both cases, the Logos is abstracted from the human nature he assumed, and the Chalcedonian formula is read in terms of the second [possibility] rather than the third.” (p.355) (my emphasis)

McCormack further suggests that the reason why we hold on to this concept of “divine immutability” is because of our “substantialism” – our “substance” way of thinking of God’s “essence”. In such a way of thinking, “substance” is what it is that makes for the self-identical element in “persons” and it is complete in itself. In another words, when we define the essence of God in terms of his substance, we
“[…] make the essence of God to be complete apart from, and prior to, all of his decisions and acts. At most, what God does (whether in eternity or in time) manifests, or gives expression to, what he is, but what God does in no sense constitutive of what God is.” (p.357) (his emphasis)

McCormack advocates that pursuing this line of thinking to its very end means that it will become impossible to understand the human nature of Jesus Christ as the human nature of the eternal logos. Any attribution of anything “human” to the Logos would set aside the “immutalibility” of the Logos. Our understanding of the Chalcedonian formula would hence always vacillate between Apollinarianism (where the human nature is purely passive and is acted upon by the Logos) or Nestorianism (where the human nature is fully operative and where the Logos is ‘sealed off’ from its effects)!

Here is where Barth comes in, McCormack states. Barth advocates two inter-related things. Firstly, Barth replaces divine immutability which has been controlled by “substantialistic ontology” with what McCormack terms “historicized ontology” – who God is (his essence) is constituted by his sovereign and free act of self-determination in the incarnation. Secondly and inter-related, this self-determinaton is not one that happened improtu or unplanned, but is one that happened in eternity, i.e. it is an eternal decision. Pulling the two together, this means
“[…] that the being of God in eternity is a being-in-act; a “being” that is realised in the act of self determination for incarnation, and so forth. There is no state, no mode of being or existence above and prior to this eternal act of self-determination as substantialistic thinking would lead us to believe. God’s being in eternity is a being-in-act. And when, in time, he does that which he determined for himself in eternity, no change is brought about in him on an ontological level.” (p.359) (my emphasis)

All this means that for Barth, the second person of the Trinity is ‘not and never was the Logos simpliciter’. “The second person of the Trinity has- already in eternity – a name, and his name is Jesus Christ.” (p.360).

The implication of McCormack’s thought means that we can now truly think of the subject of our redemption not as a mere human being (option 1), nor as the Logos simpliciter (option 2), but really as ‘the Logos as human means’ (option 3). This means that whatever happens to the God-human in and through his human nature happens to the God-human in his divine-human unity, which means that whatever we think of as a human experience is taken up into the divine life and happens to the Logos as human. The implication for PSA is that we must not conceive of PSA as an action of God directed toward an innocent human being, nor even as an action of God the Father toward an “eternal Son” (conceived of as the Logos simpliciter, in abstraction from the human nature he assumed). But rather, PSA is an ‘event between the eternal Father and the Logos as human’ (p.364). The significance is this: PSA is where
“the human experience of “the penalty of death” that humans have merited through their sinfulness is taken into the very life of God himself. [...] The triune God pours his wrath out upon himself in and through the human nature that he has made his own in his second mode of his being – that is the ontological significance of penal substitution. The triune God takes this human experience into his own life [...] and in doing so, he vanquishes its power over us. That [...] is the meaning of penal substitution when seen against the background of a well-ordered Christology and a well-ordered doctrine of the Trinity.” (p.364).

I have two comments of McCormack’s proposal. The first is that McCormack has provided us a thorough-going and well detailed exploration into the Chalcedonian formula and its application to PSA, and in doing so, has highlighted the deeper ‘inconsistencies’ in the Formula when pressed to its upmost degree. And that is, as much as the Chalcedonian Formula tries to state the unity of the two natures in the one person, the refusal (due to our “substantialistic” way of thinking) to allow human experiences to be taken up into the person of the Logos (thought of as the Logos simpliciter) means that we will either reduce the human nature to a totally passive role in that it is merely an object acted upon or we will elevate the human nature such that it is totally operative and ‘seal’ off the Logos Simpliciter from any human experiences. This leads to the inconsistency. McCormack ‘s proposal allows for human experiences to be taken up into the divine life through the Logos as the God-man in its God-man unity. The implication for PSA is that there is so much more weight now when we say what happens in PSA is that ‘God Himself enters into his own wrath’ and that ‘God Himself steps in and bears our sin’. In fact, I am wondering if McCormack’s proposal might serve a solution to the logical difficulty posed by Oliver Crisp (see previous post) about whether Jesus in any way could have borne our guilt and our sin itself (though he definitely bears the penalty of our sin). If, taking Barth’s thoughts one step further, Jesus the God-man is both the object as well as the subject of election, if Jesus is both the elected one in that He is both the condemned one (reprobate one) and the one who experiences salvation as the true representative of humanity, then would that provide a way to explain how our guilt and sin is actually borne by Jesus, because our humanity is understood in light of this crucial eternal decision of God to become man for us? However, I am well aware of the consequences of such thinking, which in turn leads me to my second comment of McCormack’s proposal, and that is McCormack does not trace out the full implications of Barth’s thinking in this essay. And if McCormack did so, then we would inevitably end up with the bigger question (and one of the criticisms of Barth’s theology) of universalism (See Garry Williams ‘Karl Barth and the doctrine of the atonement’ in Engaging with Barth (Nottingham: APOLLOS; 2008), esp.262-270 for a fuller engagement). The question is whether we can go ‘part of the way’ with Barth’s thesis, or whether logic and consistency would have us go all the way – a question reserved for another time another place.

Karl Barth's doctrine of election and its implication for theological ontology

Reading my former lecturer's post the other day on Professor Bruce McCormack's paper on reconstructing Barth's doctrine of the Trinity in light of his later Christology (which he presented at the Trinitarian Conference in Auckland) reminded me of one his articles I've read earlier in college. The title of the essay is 'Grace and being: The role of God's gracious election in Karl Barth's theological ontology' in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (ed. John Webster; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 92-110.

Here, Professor McCormack contends that, from the vantage point of a hundred years from now, Barth's greatest contribution to the development of church doctrine will be located in his doctrine of election. His doctrine '[established] a hermeneutical rule which would allow the church to speak authoritatively about what God was doing - and indeed, who and what God was/is - 'before the foundation of the world', without engaging in speculation'. (92, his emphasis). For those in the know, the unique facet of Barth's doctrine of election was that he saw Jesus Christ, the God-man, as both the Subject of election and its Object; as both the electing God and the elect human. While Barth's doctrine of election has attracted accusations of it heading towards universalism (since Jesus is the elected man who represents the entire human race), Professor McCormack highlights that what was really at stake for Barth in this issue was a question of divine ontology. "The electing God, Barth argues, is not an unknown 'x'. He is a God whose very being - already in eternity - is determined, defined by what he reveals himself to be in Jesus Christ; viz. a God of love and mercy towards the whole human race." (97). The following quote summarises the issue at stake:

What we see in the collision between Calvin and Barth, then, is not simply a clash between two views of the extent of election. At the most fundamental level, it is a clash between a theologian working with what we might call an 'essentialist' ontology and a theologian working with an 'actualistic' ontology. Calvin knows of a mode of being or existence on the part of the Logos asarkos which is independent of his being/existence as Redeemer. Such a view presupposes an 'essentialist' ontology in accordance with which the 'essence' of the Logos (or, as we might prefer, the 'self-identical element' which makes the Logos to be the Subject that it is) is understood to be complete in itself apart from and prior to all actions and relations of that Subject. And divine 'essence', on this view, is something hidden to human perception and ,finally, unknowable.

Barth too, knows of an 'essence' (a self-identical element) in God, but for him 'essence' is given in the act of electing and is, in fact, constituted by that eternal act. It is not an independent 'something' that stands behind all God's acts and relations. God's being, for Barth, is a being-in-act; first, as a being-in-act in eternity and then corresponding to that, as a being-in-act in time. [...] Most importantly, if the eternal being of God is constituted by His eternal act of turning towards the human race - if that is what God is 'essentially' - then God's essence is not hidden to human perception. It is knowable because it is constituted by the act of turning towards us. God in himself is God 'for us'. Knowing God in this way, we can trust that the love and mercy toward the whole human race demonstrated in Jesus' subjection of himself to death on a cross is 'essential' to God and that election is therefore universal in scope. (98-99, emphasis in bold mine)

Deep and interesting words! Shows that for Barth, the issue has ultimately to do with knowing God - or more strictly, knowing God's essence, which is constituted by the act of the incarnation. This does not render the incarnation to be a non-historical event, but it does mean that for Barth, God's essence or being pre-incarnation is one that is already anticipative of the incarnation, and God decided it to be so through his election of Jesus Christ.

While the logic of Barth's thought does lead one to a greater confidence and assurance that God in himself is God 'for us', and in this sense we can say with a greater confidence that we know (because it has been revealed this way) even the essence of God, we have to ask if Barth's doctrine of election can be supported by Scripture. Scripture seems to present more of specific human beings as the object of election (Eph 1:3-4), though Christ is the mirror by which we contemplate our own election (Inst. 3.24.5), and Scripture presents God the Father as the one who does the electing. Also, while Barth's doctrine of election may secure a more knowable 'God in himself', we have to admit that one entailment of his doctrine is that it is hard to escape from the charge of universalism, a point repeatedly refuted by Scripture. So on the balance, my personal preference is to go with Calvin. While that in turn will lead to us ultimately not knowing the essence of God, as Barth and Professor McCormack has pointed out, we just have to trust in the axiom that the 'economic Trinity best reveals the immanent Trinity', i.e. if the love God showed for us in the economy of salvation is the love that flows out from his inter-Trinitarian love that he has in Himself, then we can trust that God in Himself will very much be like how God is towards us, while ultimately leaving space for a godly silence that resists any form of pinpoint accuracy.