Thinking Deeper on Penal Substitutionary Atonement 3

In this third post, we will explore some of the theological issues pertaining to PSA, as gleaned from the essays from The Atonement Debate and The Glory of The Atonement.

In ‘Penal Substitution: A response to recent criticisms’ (Atonement), Garry Williams addresses 4 criticisms levelled against PSA – that PSA entails a mistaken doctrine of God by ascribing retributive justice to him; that PSA conflicts with the doctrine of the Trinity by severing the Father from the Son; that PSA grows out of modern Western individualism with its conception of “autobiographical justice”, and that PSA is guilty of doctrinal isolation in that it has no place for the life of Jesus, it cannot account for the cosmic scope of the work of Christ, and it undermines the need for moral renewal in the life of the believer subsequent to conversion (p.172-173). Williams handles each criticism in turn.

For the first criticism, Williams highlights that punishment can be intrinsic, follow from an act (i.e. as cause-and-effect), and yet still be retributive in character, especially if the punishment is deliberately brought about by some superhuman agency. This is against the definition of the opponents of PSA who restrict retribution to purely extrinsic and voluntarily and not part of a cause-and-effect sequence. Williams also highlights that retributive punishment can be imposed for both the acts and the character behind the acts, with the acts serving as evidence of the character. Finally, Williams highlights that punishment can be both personal and retributive in nature, as in the case with God’s judgement. There is no antithesis between the two – one can be in a non-relationship with Christ and that non-relationship can be seen as retributive punishment as well.

For the second criticism that PSA acts against the doctrine of the Trinity, Williams reminds us of Augustine’s principle that since the Father, Son, and Spirit are inseparable, so they work inseparably. Jesus must not be thought of as purely the object in the atonement, and the Father the subject. Rather, Jesus himself is also the subject (he willingly lays down his life John 10:17-18), and even if his role within the Godhead in atonement is distinguished as the object, he is a willing object. Against the third criticism of individualism, Williams states that PSA in fact operates on a denial of individualism – the ‘guilty individual is not punished for his or her own sins as an individual. Rather, corporate categories are powerfully at work in the historic doctrine of penal substitution’ (p.181). But rather, in Christ our corporate head, as we become members of his body in the mystical spiritual bond between us and Christ, we find our punishment taken on our behalf and forgiveness found. Williams in fact suggests that this understanding of ‘corporate substitution’ will lend itself well in a postmodern culture which holds to ‘a communal accounting of human nature’ (p.183). Against the fourth criticism, Williams uses the idea of ‘Jesus as new Israel’ (as emphasised by N.T. Wright) to show how his whole life exemplified the pattern of PSA - “Jesus is Israel, and he is exiled. Exile is the punishment for Israel’s disobedience, and Jesus takes it on himself as the new Israel. Having borne the penalty for sin, he then rises to life and brings forgiveness.” (p.183). Williams also states that PSA has a cosmic renewal element to it as well – it is precisely because Jesus exhausted the curse of spiritual death that there can be resurrection and new creation. Finally, PSA also leads to moral renewal as Rom 6 so clearly teaches – “we died to sin, how can we live in it any longer?”

In conclusion, Williams states:

“Penal substitution is central because of its explanatory power with regards to the justice of the other models of the atonement. Note that such a claim affirms rather than denies the existence of other models, but it also affirms the centrality of penal substitutionary atonement to them.” (p.188).

In ‘Atonement, Creation and Trinity’ (Atonement), Graham McFarlane affirms that ‘the doctrine of creation provides the backdrop against which our thinking of the cross and the Trinity must be developed’ (p.194). Our understanding of humanity is hence bound up with our understanding of ourselves as relational beings (“we are to the degree we relate” p.195); sin is a manifestation of disordered relating and relationships and hence nothing less than a relational catastrophe; and hence the cross addresses ‘a multilayered network of relational associations it seeks to resolve’ (p.200). It is against this backdrop that McFarlane suggests that what happens on the cross is nothing less than the ‘place where the Lord of creation both covers our sins and stems the consequences of our relational dysfunction’ and he does so out of his initiative, not ours (p.202). Is there a place for justice within this backdrop? Yes, McFarlane proposes, but it is to be placed within the context of the Father’s love (McFarlane states that we must not think of PSA as God does not necessarily need to love but he does need to judge), and we must not think of atonement as primarily a desire for justice; rather, it is the restoration of relationship that is on view. McFarlane states, “divine love reshapes divine justice and does so by going beyond the boundaries established by normal law” (p.204). In line with his ‘relational’ backdrop, atonement for McFarlane is also covered comprehensively not just by Jesus’ death, but also by his incarnation, his life of obedience and his resurrection.

Finally, in ‘The Logic of Penal Substitution Revisited’ (Atonement), Oliver Crisp shows his strength in philosophical theology by examining in detail the logic of PSA. After outlining the assumptions behind PSA and restating the doctrine, Crisp outlines 4 ‘logical’ problems with PSA – i) Whether the doctrine of PSA reduces the love of God to something arbitrary in that God chooses to love only an elect, less than the total number of humanity, on no other basis than that he wills to do so ii) PSA seems to limit God from being able to simply forgive sin iii) Does PSA entail the actual transfer of sin from the sinner to Christ, and not just the transfer of penal consequences of that sin from the sinner to Christ? iv) Does PSA also mean guilt is transferred?

Crisp answers by first stating the PSA means that its proponents have to (or must) allow a concept of legal relaxation that applies to Christ’s atonement i.e. Christ is able to take on the punishment for sin because God decides that Christ’s work satisfies the requirement for sin, and God is willing to accept Christ’s work as a substitute for the sin of those human beings whom Christ came to save. Built into this is also the premise that the legal relaxation of punishment in the case of the atonement is consistent with divine justice. With regards to problem i), Crisp states that the problem is not so much one of penal substitution as a theory of the atonement but the way in which this theory is applied. If the defender of PSA holds onto particular redemption, then an arbitrariness problem does follow. “But a defender of PSA does not need to embrace this conclusion simply because they think PSA is right” (p.221). With regards to problem ii), Crisp suggests that the assumptions behind PSA already weakens the argument – ‘if divine justice is both retributive and inexorable such that God cannot permit forgiveness without punishment or satisfaction, then God cannot simply forgive sin without satisfaction being made’ (p.221). With regards to iii) and iv), Crisp honestly admits that this poses for the proponent of PSA a serious problem. I quote him:

“[…] The central problem with penal substitution remains: it is not possible for the sin and guilt of one individual to be transferred to another individual. […] Perhaps God can relax his justice to the extent that he can accept a vicarious satisfaction of the infinite debt owed by human beings instead of punishing them. If God can do this, it is a legal arrangement that has no obvious parallel in human penal transactions and still appears to be unjust, even if it is not arbitrary. And this problem alone poses serious difficulties for the traditional arguments for penal substitution.” (p.223).

However, Crisp states ‘matters are not as bleak’ as what is suggested. Crisp proposes 2 possibilities. The first is to go for an Anselmian satisfaction theory instead of a penal substitution theory. This ‘is a robust doctrine of atonement that delivers much of what penal substitution promises without some of the more problematic aspects of penal substitution’ (p.223). The other way is to ‘salvage’ the traditional doctrine of PSA by appealing to Augustinian realism, where God ‘constitutes humanity one metaphysical whole for the purposes of the imputation of sin’ (p.224). This calls for a closer examination of the doctrine of union with Christ – not just to see how Union with Christ provides us a way to see the benefits of salvation applied to us; but also how union with Christ can provide a robust doctrine of PSA – a task which I would very much like to take up in the future!