Thinking Deeper on Penal Substitutionary Atonement 1

September has been spent reading and thinking deeper on Penal Substitutionary Atonement (PSA)– mainly from essays of two books on the subject, The Atonement Debate: Papers from the London Symposium on the theology of atonement (ed. Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, & Justin Thacker; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008), and The Glory of the Atonement (ed. Charles E. Hill & Frank A. James III; Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2004).
I hope to, in the following posts, address some of the issues. We begin with objections to PSA.

Steve Chalke in ‘The Redemption of the Cross’ (Atonement) presents why he is against PSA. Incidentally, the current debate on PSA was ‘revived’ in part by Chalke’s The Lost Message of Jesus. Biblically, Chalke argues that PSA does not fit comfortably the ‘multicoloured rather than monochrome’ presentation of the theology of the atonement in the New Testament (though he admits there is substitution in the atonement, just not of a penal nature). In one portion of the essay, Chalke candidly states his difficulty with PSA:
“The greatest theological problem with penal substitution is that it presents us with a God who is first and foremost concerned with retribution for sin that flows from his wrath against sinners. The only way for his anger to be placated is in receiving recompense from those who have wronged him, and although his great love motivates him to send his Son, his wrath remains the driving force behind the need for the cross.” (p.39)
Historically, Chalke (quoting Joel Green and Mark Baker) argues that supporters of PSA have tended to “read back” modern views of PSA onto ancient texts or writings of the church fathers or early Christian writers to bolster their claims - the most famous example of which is the work of Anselm of Canterbury. Culturally, PSA fosters violence (“Penal substitutionary theory betrays Jesus’ attempt to root out the tendency of religion to lead to violence by inventing a theology of his death that is in direct opposition to his teaching”, p.41), and reflects ‘the 19th and 20th century culturally dominant values of individualism, autonomy and consumerism’. Pastorally and ethically, PSA seems to offer instant forgiveness without challenging basic day-to-day moral behaviour (ibid.) For Chalke, the best idea or concept that helps capture the story of salvation lies very closely to the Christus Victor view . He states in closing:
“It is Easter Sunday, not Good Friday, that shows the new kingdom in all its glory and God’s love in all its fullness. On the cross, Jesus does not placate God’s anger in taking the punishment for sin but rather absorbs its consequences and, as three days later he is raised, defeats death. It is the resurrection which finally puts the Victor in Christus Victor!” (p.44)

Another essay heading in the same direction is that of Joel Green ‘Must we imagine the atonement in penal substitutionary terms? Questions, caveats and a plea’ (Atonement). Green begins by referring to the Apostles’ Creed – how though the place of the cross is vitally important, the Creed remains silent when it comes to the more specific question of how Jesus’ death is salvific. This means, as Green proposes, that ‘one can inhabit the land of Christian orthodoxy, classically defined, without embracing a particular theory of the atonement, be it the now-regnant penal substitutionary model or some other’ (p.154). Green also states his view that mere or more biblical exegesis only will not solve the question. Rather, ‘larger issues are operating’ (p.155). Green’s contention against PSA is that it ‘strips Jesus’ death from its historical context in the Roman world and from its narrative context in the Gospels. Theologically, the model of penal substitutonary atonement eclipses the historical particularity of Jesus’ crucifixion, resulting in a serious deficit of interest in the incarnation and in Jesus’ human life and mission’ (p.159), i.e. PSA seems to advocate a view where only the death of Jesus is important – his incarnation, his obedient and faithful life, and his resurrection are at best sidelined, and at worst ignored. Green then proceeds on to name three questions that arise from biblical exegesis regarding PSA. The first is ‘by what logic can it be assumed that anger is quenched by acting upon it [through PSA]’ (p.160) – in another words, does the transfer of guilt satisfy the demands of justice? (A vital question which Oliver Crisp deals with in his brilliant essay ‘the logic of penal substitution revisited’ in the same volume, which I hope to address later). Secondly, if the Apostle Paul depended on the Old Testament notion of atoning sacrifice, there is no strict connection that the OT idea of sacrifice concerns the appeasement of God’s wrath; or that the appeasement of God’s wrath is the best way to articulate the instrumentality of that atonement (Green here is returning to the ‘expiation’ vs. ‘propitiation’ debate about the nature of OT sacrifices). Thirdly, in response to those who suggest that Rom 3:21-26 builds upon the picture of a God of wrath from Rom 1-2, Green contends that there is nothing to suggest that the wrath of God in Rom 1-2 is vindictive indignation or the anger of divine retribution. Rather, it is God’s divine response to human unfaithfulness. He states, “wicked acts do not stir up the wrath of God but are themselves already the consequences of the active presence of God’s wrath. That is, sinful activity if the result of God’s letting us go our own way, and this letting us go our own way constitutes God’s wrath.” (p.163). Culturally, Green also suggests that PSA is greatly indebted to ‘its incubation in an environment structured around individualism and mechanism’ – ‘individualism’ where we understand the death of Jesus in forensic terms focused on the status of the individual before God; and ‘mechanism’ where we are only satisfied with views of the atonement that clarify “how” in objective, cause-effect relations (p.164-65). In conclusion, Green states, “In short, the model of penal substitutionary atonement provides, at best , no basis for a thoroughgoing soteriology and, at worst, stands in its way.” (p.167).

I refer to these two essays because together, they summarise the main arguments against PSA and show the kind of attacks PSA is subjected under today – from the biblical exegesis front (is PSA a true or even accurate picture of the atonement from the wealth of biblical passages or the whole biblical storyline?); from the logic front (how does PSA work logically? Can it even by transferring guilt actually work in satisfying justice?); from the historical theology front (Does PSA accurately represent the views of the church fathers or early Christian writers?); from the systematic theology front (What is the doctrine of God assumed in the view of PSA or any other view for that matter?); from the ethics front (Does PSA promote ‘cheapened’ Christian living?); and from the cultural and contemporary front (Is PSA flourishing only because of the modern cultural context of individualism we are in? Is PSA still needed and useful in postmodernity?) These are huge questions which I hope to start addressing in subsequent posts.